a b s t r a c t de Vries, Gaaitzen J., Erumban, Abdul A., Timmer, Marcel P., Voskoboynikov, IlyaDeconstructing the BRICs: Structural transformation and aggregate productivity growth This paper studies structural transformation and its implications for productivity growth in the BRIC countries (Brazil,
Introduction
A central insight in development economics is that development entails structural change. Structural change, narrowly defined as the reallocation of labor across sectors, featured prominently in the early literature on economic development by Kuznets (1966) . As labor and other resources move from traditional into modern economic activities, overall productivity rises and incomes expand. The nature and speed with which structural transformation takes place is considered one of the key factors that differentiate successful countries from unsuccessful ones (McMillan and Rodrik, 2011) . Therefore, 1 Technological change typically takes place at the level of industries and induces differential patterns of sectoral productivity growth. At the same time, changes in domestic demand and international trade patterns drive a process of structural transformation in which labor, capital and intermediate inputs are continuously relocated between firms, sectors and countries (Kuznets, 1966; Chenery et al., 1986; Harberger, 1998; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009) . One of the best documented patterns of structural change is the shift of labor and capital from production of primary goods to manufacturing and later to services. This featured prominently in explanations of divergent growth patterns across Europe, Japan and the U.S. in the post-WW-II period (Denison, 1967; Maddison, 1987; Jorgenson and Timmer, 2011) . Another finding is that in low-income countries the level and growth rate of labor productivity in agriculture is considerably lower than in the rest of the economy, reflecting differences in the nature of the production function, in investment opportunities, and in the rate of technical change (Syrquin, 1984; Crafts, 1984; Gollin et al., 2011) . Together these findings suggest a potentially important role for resource allocation from lower to higher productive activities to boost aggregate productivity growth. Based on the sector database of Timmer and de Vries (2009) , the IADB (2010) and McMillan and Rodrik (2011) found that structural change was contributing to productivity growth in Asia; whereas it was absent or even reducing growth in Africa and Latin America. Also Bosworth and Collins (2008) found strong growth-enhancing structural change in China and India.
So far, however, analyses of structural change in developing countries are constrained by the availability of detailed sector data, obscuring a proper assessment of the role of structural transformation in driving aggregate productivity growth. Typically, data is only available for broad sectors such as agriculture, industry and services, hiding important reallocations that can take place, for example from low-productive garment making to high-productive transport equipment manufacturing. Also a distinction between formal and informal activities within a sector, say informal and formal textile manufacturing may have important consequences for our understanding of the effects of structural change on aggregate growth. Productivity growth in the formal sector could go hand-in-hand with a substitution of capital for labor and thereby a push of employment into low-productive informality, but such reallocation effects would not be picked up in an aggregate analysis. This paper addresses these issues by studying the role of structural change for growth in four large developing countries, the BRIC countries: Brazil, China, India and Russia. The acronym BRIC was invented by Jim O'Neill in 2001 to group these four developing countries because of their recent growth spurts and potential for future domination of the world economy due to their population and economic size. Economic growth in China and India in particular has been well above world average, and provides a foundation for the growth of world GDP. Fig. 1 shows that the share of the BRICs in world GDP increased from about 15% in 1980 to 27% in 2008. To analyze the role of structural change in BRICs' growth, we present a harmonized time-series database of value added and persons engaged with a common detailed 35 sector classification (ISIC revision 3). The dataset builds upon the time-series of broad sectors for China and India by Bosworth and Collins (2008) and for Asian and Latin American countries by Timmer and de Vries (2009) . It adds further detail and harmonizes the measurement of output and employment across countries, which is important for a comparative and more fine-grained analysis of economic growth and production. Data on number of workers is based on the broadest employment concept, including self-employment, family-workers and other informal workers. The dataset is based on a critical assessment of the coverage and consistency of concepts and definitions used in various primary data sources. The sector database is publicly available.
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Using the canonical shift-share method we find strong growth-enhancing effects of structural change in China, India, and Russia, but not in Brazil. This confirms the findings of McMillan and Rodrik (2011) and Bosworth and Collins (2008) . However, we show that these results are sensitive to the level of aggregation by performing the same decomposition at various levels of aggregation such as 3, 10 and 35 industries. This is true in particular, when a distinction is made between formal and informal activities within sectors. To this end, we use detailed national accounts data for India, and nationally representative surveys of the informal sector in Brazil. For example, in India the informal sector accounts for up to 30% of manufacturing's value added, compared with an 80% share in employment, indicating large differences in productivity between formal and informal activities. Our analysis suggests that in India the expansion of informal activities after the reforms is associated with a reduction in aggregate growth. In contrast, employment reallocation towards formal activities in Brazil is increasing aggregate growth after 2000.
This shows the importance of using detailed industry data to analyze structural change as the standard decomposition method is quite sensitive to the level of aggregation. We extend the decomposition method to show formally that by relying on aggregate sector data only, reallocation effects can be substantially over-or underestimated. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main issues in constructing the harmonized BRIC dataset, relegating a detailed description of sources and methods by country to a Supplementary data. The decomposition method to measure the contribution of sectors to growth is presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses trends in production structures and presents decomposition results by country. In Section 5, we account for employment reallocation across formal and informal activities in decomposing growth for Brazil and India. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
Sector database for the BRIC countries
In this section we discuss the general approach in constructing a database that provides time-series on value added, price deflators, and employment by sector, following the methodology developed by Timmer and de Vries (2009) , also used by McMillan and Rodrik (2011) . The database is constructed on the basis of an in-depth study of available statistical sources. National data is harmonized in terms of industry classifications. The classification list has 35 sectors based on the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) revision 3 shown in Table 1. Data series are annual and run  from 1980 to 2008 for Brazil, from 1995 to 2008 for Russia, from 1981 to 2008 for India, and from 1987 to 2008 for  China. Gross value added in current and constant prices is taken from the national accounts of the various countries. In recent years, value added series have been compiled according to the 1993 United Nations System of National Accounts (UN SNA, see UN (1993) ). Therefore, international comparability is high, in principle. However, the national statistical office of China only proceeded to change its statistical procedures from a Material Product System (MPS) to the UN SNA in 1992. And although in Russia the statistical office adopted the UN SNA in the early 1990s, a UN SNA consistent set of industry data is only presented from 2002 onwards. The shift from the MPS to the UN SNA has been gradual in China and Russia. Some elements of the MPS are still visible, such as the grouping and treatment of services into material product and non-material product services in the China Statistical Yearbook. Beside these major shifts in the statistical system of Russia and China, national statistical institutes frequently change methodologies as well. In the national accounts, GDP series are periodically revised which includes changes in the coverage of activities (for example after a full economic census has been carried out and ''new'' activities have been discovered), changes in the methods of calculation, and changes in base year of the prices used for calculating volume growth rates.
Changes in the methodology and statistical system introduce breaks in the time series. Our general approach to solve this issue, is to start with GDP levels for the most recently available benchmark year, expressed in that year's prices, from the national accounts provided by the national statistical institute or central bank. Historical national accounts series are subsequently linked to this benchmark year using an overlapping year between the old and the new series. This linking procedure ensures that growth rates of individual series are retained although absolute levels are adjusted according to the most recent information and methods.
Employment series are typically not part of the core set of national account statistics put out by national statistical institutes. Usually, only total employment is available from the national accounts. To arrive at sector-level data, additional material has been collected from population censuses, and employment and labor force statistics. For each country, a choice was made of the best statistical source for consistent employment data at the industry level.
For Brazil, recent time-series data of value added in current and constant prices are obtained from the national accounts at IBGE. These series have the 2000 population census as the reference year. Employment series are an integral part of the input-output framework underlying the national accounts and these series include own-account workers. Therefore, we use the detailed employment data from the input-output tables as the main source. The main source for employment series in Russia is the system of national accounts employment statistics, which provides full-time equivalent jobs by one- Employment data for India is based on the Employment and Unemployment Surveys from the National Sample Survey Organization. The employment definition used is the 'usual principal and subsidiary status'. This definition is to a large extent comparable over the various rounds of the survey, and has a wide acceptance as a measure of employment (Bosworth and Collins, 2008) . In addition, this employment definition is used in the national account statistics for India. In our opinion, the employment data that we use for India is the best available, but it should be noted that the quality and reliability of employment data for India is intensively discussed and subject to great scrutiny (see Srinivasan (2010) and the Supplementary data to this paper for an extensive discussion). Finally, employment series by three broad sectors for China are from various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook. Detailed industrial employment series for 35 industries are based on various issues of the China Industrial Economic Statistics Yearbook and the China Labor Statistical Yearbook. The more detailed industry data is made consistent with the aggregate three-sector data by taking into account the discrepancies between employment statistics in regular reports and population censuses. Therefore, the three sector employment data for China and India match with those used by Bosworth and Collins (2008) . Employment in our data set is defined as 'all persons employed', including all paid employees, but also informal workers such as own-account workers and employers of informal firms. The inclusion of own-account workers is crucial for the measurement of productivity levels in developing countries (McMillan and Rodrik, 2011) .
3 It is especially important for industries which have a large share of self-employed workers, such as agriculture, low-skilled manufacturing, trade, business and personal services. In Section 5, we specifically aim to distinguish between formal and informal activities within sectors. Statistical offices in the BRIC countries have been collecting information for long. Therefore, multiple sources of information on output and inputs are available. The difficulty is selecting the highest quality data and combining the information in a consistent manner. In the Supplementary data to this paper, we provide a detailed description and discussion of the sources and methods on a country-by-country basis. 
Structural decomposition method
To measure the contribution of structural change to growth, we start with the canonical decomposition originating from Fabricant (1942) . The change in aggregate labor productivity levels (DP) can be written as:
with L i the average share of sector i in overall employment, and R the reallocation term. In Eq.
(1), the change in aggregate productivity is decomposed into within-sector productivity changes (the first term on the right-hand side which we call the ''within-effect'' (also known as ''intra-effect''), and the effect of changes in the sectoral allocation of labor which we call the ''reallocation-effect'', (the second term, also known as the ''shift-effect'' or ''structural-change effect''). The within-effect is positive (negative) when the weighted change in labor productivity levels in sectors is positive (negative). The reallocation-effect is a residual term, which measures the contribution of labor reallocation across sectors, being positive (negative) when labor moves from less (more) to more (less) productive sectors. One advantage of this approach above partial analyses of productivity performance within individual sectors is that it accounts for aggregate effects. For example, a high rate of productivity growth within say manufacturing can have ambiguous implications for overall economic performance if manufacturing's share of employment shrinks rather than expands. If the displaced labor ends up in activities with lower productivity, economy-wide growth will suffer. It should be noted that this reallocation term is only a static measure of the allocation effect as it depends on differences in productivity levels across sectors, not growth rates. Growth and levels are often, but not necessarily, correlated. 4 The reallocation term is often used as an indicator for the success of structural transformation (e.g. Bosworth and Collins, 2008; IADB, 2010; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011) .
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One aim of this paper is to investigate whether the reallocation term is affected by a change in the level of aggregation used in the decomposition. Typically, decompositions are carried out at the level of broad sectors. This paper uses a more detailed dataset finding different decomposition results. For example, aggregate trends in manufacturing might hide considerable variation at a lower level. Aggregate manufacturing productivity growth might be the result of a shrinking formal sector, outsourcing labor-intensive activities to small informal firms. This effect is picked up as a negative reallocation effect in our more detailed decomposition analysis, but not by an analysis based on aggregate manufacturing data. Structural change will be growth-reducing when the shift of labor from formal to informal activities is properly accounted for. In Section 5 we will show that this is indeed the case for India after the reforms.
More formally, let each sector i consists of a number of subsectors j. As before, for each sector i the change in labor productivity is given by a weighted growth of subsectors j, with share of j in i employment as weights, and a residual term measuring the reallocation across industries in a sector i (R i ):
where L i;j is the average share of subsector j in sector i employment Substituting Eq. (2) in Eq.
(1), it is easily shown that the change in aggregate productivity can be decomposed in an employment weighted change of productivity levels in all subsectors j plus a new reallocation term:
where L j is the average share of subsector j in overall employment. Formula (3) shows that the new overall reallocation effect consists of the reallocation of labor between sectors i (the old R), and the reallocation effects between subsectors j within each sector i (R i summed over all sectors). In the example above, R i is negative for manufacturing bringing down the overall reallocation effect. This indicates the importance of having a detailed sector database to analyze the role of structural change in economic growth, not only in theory but also empirically as we will argue in the next sections.
Structural transformation in the BRIC countries
We combine the sector database with the decomposition method to examine the contribution of structural change to productivity growth. We first aggregate the data to three broad sectors (agriculture, industry, and services; see last column the marginal productivity of labor is average productivity times the labor share in value added. If labor shares differ across sectors, an analysis based on average productivity may be misleading. For example, high average productivity in capital-intensive industries such as petroleum refining (ISIC rev. 3, sector 23) and public utilities (ISIC rev. 3, sector E) may simply reflect a low labor share (see Appendix Tables A1-A4 for data). We assume that marginal and average productivities have a strong correlation. Mundlak et al. (2008) and Gollin et al. (2011) found that differences in average productivity in agriculture and manufacturing are related to large gaps in marginal productivity. Similarly, controlling for capital, productivity is higher in formal as compared to informal activities (de Vries, 2010) . 5 Various decomposition methods have been proposed in the literature. Initial-year, mid-year, or end-year shares can be used, with the former typically giving a greater weight to the reallocation-effect as compared to the latter. To minimize this index number problem, we use mid-year average employment shares (see Balk (2001) for an overview). Alternatively, one can use value added shares as weights instead of employment, as in Bosworth and Collins (2008) . This approach is less appealing as it does not focus on a reallocation of inputs but of outputs.
in Table 1 for classification) and apply formula (3), and do the same for the full 35 sector detail. In Section 5 we additionally distinguish between formal and informal activities within sectors before applying the decomposition. Descriptive statistics on production and employment structures, as well as decomposition results are presented by country. We follow the BRIC acronym in chronological order and observe that productivity growth rates steadily rise as we move from Brazil (1.1% average annual since 1995) via Russia (4.4% since 1995) and India (4.7% since 1991) to China (8.7% annually since 1997). Table 2 shows a drop in agricultural employment shares in Brazil, falling from about 38% of total employment in 1980 to 18% in 2008. Declining agricultural employment shares are a common feature across growing economies. In Brazil, labor moves to services industries, which contrasts with the experience of China (see below) and past developments in US, Europe and Japan where agricultural workers moved mainly to manufacturing (Kuznets, 1966) . More industry detail can be found in Appendix Table A1 . It indicates notable increases in employment shares in retail trade (from 6% to 12% of total employment), business services (from 6% to 9%), education (from 3% to 6%), and public administration (from 3% to 5%).
Brazil
At the same time, productivity levels differ sharply across sectors (see last three columns in Table 2 , as well as the last three columns in Appendix Table A1 ). In 1980, the agricultural productivity level was 13% of total economy level, whereas services were at 167% of the average productivity level. Over time, productivity growth in agriculture was fast, which can be observed from the increase in the relative productivity level of agriculture, rising from 13% to 36%, whereas services productivity growth was slow. High productivity growth in agriculture is partly related to advancements in farm yields as well as a reduction in surplus labor (disguised unemployment) from the movement of workers to services (Baer, 2008) .
In Table 3 , we show the decomposition results from applying equation (3) to the 3 broad sector database, and the 35 detailed sector database. Note that we first aggregate data to a particular level (e.g. 3 or 35 sectors) before applying the decomposition. 6 As argued in Section 3, a decomposition analysis with more detailed data may result in a different contribution of structural change to growth. Decomposition results are shown for the period from 1980 to 1995 and from 1995 to 2008. 7 For the period from 1980 to 1995, average annual productivity growth was À0.9%. The 'lost decade' of Latin America actually lasted one and a half decade in Brazil, which is particularly reflected in negative productivity growth rates in services (À2.0% and À1.6% points contributions at the 3-sector and 35-sector level respectively). Nevertheless, the movement of workers towards services which had an above-average productivity level is associated with a positive reallocation effect, Table 3 Structural transformation and aggregate productivity growth in Brazil. Source: authors calculations using the sector database and Eq. (3). 1995 1995 1980 -1995 1980 -1995 35-Sector (%) 3-Sector (%) 35-Sector (%) (2) 0.6 0.1 1.1 0.8 Aggregate productivity growth (3) = (1) + (2) 1.1 1.1 À0.9 À0.9
Note: Aggregate productivity growth is the average annual logarithmic growth rate. Numbers may not sum due to rounding. Note: L i refers to the employment share of sector i. Numbers may not sum due to rounding. RP i refers to the productivity level of sector i relative to the total economy productivity level.
6 The within-effects by sector and the reallocation effect are multiplied with the period-average annual productivity growth rate after the decomposition. 7 In the literature on economic growth in Latin America, it is common to analyze growth rates before and after 1990 since most reforms were implemented around that year (e.g. IADB, 2010; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011) . For Brazil, however, we prefer to consider the period before and after 1995. Brazil faced a prolonged period of (hyper-) inflation from 1986 to 1994, which crippled productivity growth. Only after the successful introduction of the Plano Real in 1994 did hyperinflation cede and did productivity growth resume (see Baer (2008) for a discussion of the Plano Real). If we consider the same period from 1990 to 2005 at the 35-sector level, as in McMillan and Rodrik (2011), we also find that structural change was not conducive for growth in Brazil.
amounting to 1.1% points at the 3-sector level. After 1995, when the government managed to control inflation in its Plano Real (see also footnote 9), productivity growth became positive in all sectors. Appendix Table A1 suggests that productivity growth was particularly high in agriculture and mining, which is related with the commodity boom, but also in chemical manufacturing and financial services. For the period from 1995 to 2008 we again find a large contribution from employment reallocation to services (0.6% points), explaining about halve of aggregate growth. However, in the latter period, sector trends obscure subsector trends. The reallocation term drops to 0.1% points when decomposing growth at the 35-sector level rather than the 3-sector level. Although the productivity level in overall services is above average (see Table 2 ), this is not true for all services sub-sectors. In particular, within the services sector labor moves to subsectors such as retail trade and renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities which have belowaverage productivity levels (see Appendix Table A1 ). Hence the reallocation effect becomes much smaller in the analysis of detailed sub-sectors. At first sight, this result confirms and strengthens the findings by IADB (2010) and McMillan and Rodrik (2011) that structural change was not conducive to growth in Brazil since 1995. However, in Section 5 we show that once making also a distinction between formal and informal activities this no longer holds true for the most recent period after 2000.
Russia
Any analysis of Russian structural change requires detailed knowledge of the treatment of oil and gas activities in the national accounts. Exports of oil and gas are about 20% of GDP during the past decade, but in the national accounts the oil and gas sector accounts only for about 10% of GDP. This puzzling observation is due to transfer pricing where large Russian oil companies use trading companies to bring their output to market (Gurvich, 2004; Kuboniwa et al., 2005) . Because of transfer pricing schemes, the value added in wholesale trade is overestimated, while underestimated in mining. We therefore introduce a new sector consisting of mining and wholesaling, alongside agriculture, industry (excl. mining), and services (excluding wholesaling).
In Table 4 , production structures of Russia's economy in 1995 and 2008 are shown. Russia is the only BRIC country where the employment share in manufacturing declines after 1995. Workers move from agriculture and manufacturing towards mining and services. In Appendix Table A2 , we find a large decline in the employment share in heavy manufacturing such as machinery equipment, whereas large gains are observed in retail and wholesale trade, as well as public administration.
To measure the contribution of sectors to growth, we decompose aggregate productivity growth from 1995 to 2008. Results are shown in Table 5 . Applying the decomposition formula to the dataset with 4 or 35 sectors hardly affects the reallocation term. In both cases, employment reallocation contributes about 1% point to growth, which is due to the above-average productivity levels in the expanding services sectors. Note: L i refers to the employment share of sector i. Numbers may not sum due to rounding. RP i refers to the productivity level of sector i relative to the total economy productivity level. (1) 3.5 3.4 Reallocation (2) 0.9 1.0 Aggregate productivity growth (3) = (1) + (2) 4.4 4.4
Note: Aggregate productivity growth is the average annual logarithmic growth rate. Numbers may not sum due to rounding.
Perhaps surprisingly, productivity improvements in mining and wholesale are not the main driver of economic growth, accounting for 0.3-0.4% points of growth.
8 Given that mining activities and wholesale trade services encompass more than those related to oil and gas only, we consider this an upper bound for the contribution of oil and gas to Russia's economic growth. Rather, productivity improvements within industrial sectors (notably food, beverages, and tobacco manufacturing, and basic metals and fabricated metal manufacturing) and services sectors (renting of machinery and equipment and other business services) mainly account for aggregate productivity growth.
India
Scholars of Indian economic development typically analyze growth rates before and after the reforms in the early 1990s as we will do here (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005) . The underlying political and institutional forces of India's GDP growth and its acceleration after the reforms are well documented in the literature (see e.g. Bhagwati, 1993; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005) . From 1981 to 1991, annual productivity growth averaged about 3%. In the post-reform period, growth accelerated to 4.7% annually. Table 6 shows employment shares and relative productivity levels. Since 1981, the agricultural employment share steadily declined from 70% in 1981 to 54% in 2008. Workers moved to both industrial and services sectors (see also Kochar et al., 2006) .
After the reforms, we observe fast increase in employment shares in construction, telecommunications and business services, driven by privatization, foreign investment and global outsourcing trends (Kochar et al., 2006) . In contrast, manufacturing employment is rather constant with little structural change within; except for the increase in textile manufacturing employment shares (see Appendix Table A3 and Dougherty (2008) for a discussion).
In Table 7 , decomposition results are presented using the sector database at the 3 and 31 sector level. 9 Indian productivity growth after the reforms is mainly driven by the expansion in the services sector which is characterized by above-average productivity levels. In both periods, structural change accounts for about 1% point of aggregate productivity change. If we decompose growth using the 31 sector detail, the contribution of reallocation increases almost another halve percentage point. These findings are consistent with Bosworth and Collins (2008) , and confirm the findings of McMillan and Rodrik (2011) : the contribution of structural change in Asian countries such as India (and China, see below) is much higher than in Latin American countries such as Brazil.
China
China is the paragon of Asia's pattern of structural change, where agricultural workers move towards manufacturing (McMillan and Rodrik, 2011) . In Table 8 , we distinguish the period from 1997 to 2008, which broadly corresponds with the public enterprise reforms in 1997 and China's exchange rate policy after its ascension to the WTO in 2001 (Rodrik, 2011) . Note: L i refers to the employment share of sector i. Numbers may not sum due to rounding. RP i refers to the productivity level of sector i relative to the total economy productivity level. (2) 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.4 Aggregate productivity growth (3) = (1) + (2) 4.7 4.7 3.0 3.0
Note: Aggregate productivity growth is the average annual logarithmic growth rate. Numbers may not sum due to rounding. 8 The 0.4% points contribution in the decomposition with 35 sectors is equally split between mining activities (0.20% points) and wholesale trade services (0.24% points). 9 For India, industry 19 (Leather and footwear) cannot be separated from 17t18 (textile and textile products). Also, transport services are grouped as 60t63.
Therefore, the sector database distinguishes 31 sectors for India.
Data on China's production structure is shown in Table 8 , with subsector detail in Appendix Table A4 . Decomposition results are shown in Table 9 . While broad sectoral trends in China are well understood (see e.g. Bosworth and Collins, 2008) , detailed sector trends have not been analyzed in a comparative perspective before, due to a lack of data. First of all, the industrial employment share is much higher in China compared to Brazil, Russia, or India, mainly due to manufacturing. In China we observe employment share gains in many manufacturing subsectors: electrical and optical equipment tops the list, but manufacturing activities related to wood, pulp, paper, rubber, and plastics increased as well. In services, on the other hand, structural change is much slower than in the other countries. The overall employment share of services is increasing, but this is highly concentrated in below-average productive sectors such as retail trade and other community and personal services. As a result, the reallocation effect is not higher than in India or Russia, accounting for about a full percentage point of aggregate growth, in line with Bosworth and Collins (2008) and McMillan and Rodrik (2011) . Clearly, manufacturing is the main contributor to aggregate productivity growth, driven by increasing employment shares of highproductive industries such as machinery manufacturing. It is in these industries that China stands out from the other BRIC nations.
Structural transformation and the informal sector in Brazil and India
In many developing countries, the informal sector accounts for the majority of employment and a substantial share of value added (Schneider and Enste, 2000) . In the extended decomposition method in Section 3, we have argued that if formal and informal activities within sectors are not distinguished, the role of structural change for growth may not be accurately measured. In this section, we explore the role of employment allocation across formal and informal activities for growth in Brazil and India. 10 The sector database that we presented in Section 2 should be distinguished from the informal sector data that we use in this section. Although the term 'informal sector' is widely used and studied since the first report on informal employment in Kenya by the ILO in 1972 (ILO, 1972 , its precise meaning and measurement remains subject to controversy (Henly et al., 2009 ). We take a pragmatic approach and rely on the definition of informality used in the country itself for collecting statistics. The common definition of the informal sector for India is based on an employment size threshold, where the so-called ''organized sector'' consists of firms employing 10 or more workers using power, and 20 or more workers without using power (see the Supplementary data for further discussion). While formal and informal activities in India are classified according to employment size, the activities face a different legal and institutional environment. For Brazil, mostly legal definitions of the informal sector are used, and the overlap between different definitions is imperfect (Henly et al., 2009) . We follow the literature and define informal employment according to contract status: a worker is classified as informal if he/she Table 9 Structural transformation and aggregate productivity growth in China. Source: authors calculations using the sector database and equation (3). 1997 1997 1987 -1997 1987 -1997 35-Sector (%) 3-Sector (%) 35-Sector (%)
Contribution of productivity growth in: Agriculture 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 Industry 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.5 Services 2.5 2.6 1.2 1.5 All sectors (1) 7.5 7.9 6.7 6.8 Reallocation (2) 1.2 0.8 1.0 0.9 Aggregate productivity growth (3) = (1) + (2) 8.7 8.7 7.7 7.7
does not have a signed labor card (Perry et al., 2007) . Also, autonomous workers, comprising own-account workers and employers of unregistered firms are considered part of the informal sector. Clearly, definitions of the informal sector vary between Brazil and India and absolute sizes should not be compared. But we can use them to analyze trends, which is what we will do here. We find that in India informality is increasing after the reforms reducing aggregate productivity growth, while the opposite is true for Brazil since 2000.
Brazil
For Brazil, consistent time series of formal and informal employment from the national accounts are available since 2000. Value added of informal sectors is estimated using income per worker ratios from surveys of the urban informal economy (Economia Informal Urbana) and household surveys (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios), which is explained in detail in the Supplementary data. Employment shares of informal activities in the overall economy decreased substantially from 62% to 55% during the past decade (see Table 10 ). This contrasts with the 1990s for which most researchers find that informal employment increased rather than decreased (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Menezes-Filho and Muendler, 2011) .
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Recent formalization of Brazil's economy might be due to a decline in the interest rate and improvements in access to credit, which make it easier and cheaper for firms to borrow (Catão et al., 2009 ). In addition, Brazil has simplified registration procedures and lowered tax rates for small firms in the SIMPLES program (Perry et al., 2007) .
12 Also government-directed industrial policies provide an incentive for firms to formalize in order to be able to win government contracts. As a result, the costs of formalizing a firm are increasingly offset by the benefits. Within sectors for which we are able to split formal and informal activities, informal employment is largest in agriculture and lowest in public utilities and financial and business services as expected. In all sectors, informal employment is going down between 2000 and 2008. In fact, the change in overall informal employment is for 77% explained by reallocation (2) 0.17 1.24 Aggregate productivity growth (3) = (1) + (2) 1.00 1.00
Note: Aggregate productivity growth is the average annual logarithmic growth rate. Numbers may not sum due to rounding. Source: authors calculations, see Date appendix. Note: IL i refers to the employment share of informal activities in sector i. RPIF i refers to the productivity level of informal activities relative to the formal activities within sector i.
11 The lack of comparable data on informal employment and value added does not allow us to distinguish between formal and informal activities for the 1990s. We expect structural change would lower growth during this period, as workers moved towards low-productive informal activities (Menezes-Filho and Muendler, 2011) . 12 The SIMPLES program was introduced in the mid-1990s and gradually expanded across the Federal states of Brazil thereafter. After 2007, a unified tax regime for small firms was introduced, which is known as 'Super Simples'.
towards formal activities within sectors. 13 Therefore, we expect positive reallocation effects as formal activities have much higher productivity levels as compared to informal activities. This is indicated in the last two columns in Table 10 which show the productivity level of informal activities relative to the formal activities within a sector. These values are all well below half. It is noteworthy that these ratios are declining over time in most sectors, in particular in manufacturing, suggesting an increasing gap in productivity between informal and formal activities. Decomposition results in Table 11 based on Eq. (3) suggest that after allowing for employment reallocation towards formal activities, the positive effects of structural change are much higher. Without making the formal/informal split structural change appeared to contribute only a little to aggregate productivity growth, as we found before. After taking account of the increasing formalization, structural change contributed more than 1.2% points, effectively explaining all of Brazil's growth since 2000. These findings qualify the view by the IADB (2010), and McMillan and Rodrik (2011) that structural change has not been growth-enhancing in Brazil. Clearly, employment reallocation towards formal activities, in particular in distributive trade and in manufacturing, is contributing to growth. 14 It remains to be seen whether this process of structural change has long-lasting dynamic effects. So far, the trends suggest that only static reallocation gains have been realized as productivity levels in both the formal and the informal sector are stagnant or even go down. This suggests a process in which the most productive informal entrepreneurs choose to formalize (de Paula and Scheinkman, 2011) , with the result that productivity levels in both the formal and the informal sector go down. This is reflected in the small or even negative contributions of productivity growth within industry and services (see last two columns in Table 11 ). In contrast to China, growth-enhancing structural change in Brazil is not accompanied by dynamic productivity growth in industry. This shows that growth-enhancing structural change is necessary but not sufficient for aggregate productivity growth.
India
For India, we have two different data sources that allow us to distinguish between formal and informal activities and explore the role of structural change for growth. The national accounts provide time series of net domestic product by formal and informal activity for nine broad sectors. Also, it presents data for organized sector by detailed manufacturing industry Note: IL i refers to the employment share of informal activities in sector i. RPIF i refers to the productivity level of informal activities relative to the formal activities within sector i. Leather and footwear products (19) is included in textile and textile products (17t18). 13 We decomposed the change in the share of informal workers in total employment between 2000 and 2008 to explore the effect of within and between industry shifts. Consider:
where IL i refers to the employment share of informal activities in sector i, and Li refers to the average share of sector i's employment in total employment. The change in overall informal employment is for 77% explained by the first term. 14 Detailed results (not shown) are available from the authors upon request.
based on the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). We combine both datasets covering 21 sectors of the economy, including 13 manufacturing industries, with for each sector a split between formal and informal activities. Informal employment is derived by subtracting organized employment from total employment obtained in labor force surveys. This residual approach is carried out by sector. Therefore, we use the employment estimates of the national sample survey organization only for survey years (hence our period begins in 1993 and ends in 2004, see the Supplementary data for further information).
In Table 12 , we provide the employment shares and relative productivity levels of informal activities in India by broad sector. The first two columns in Table 12 show that in contrast to Brazil, the share of informal employment in India increased. Also, within almost all manufacturing industries the share of informal employment was rising (Kulshreshta, 2011) , which is partly related to labor market rigidities that prevented modern manufacturing from expanding employment opportunities (Pieters et al., 2011) . At the same time, the last two columns show productivity levels of the unorganized sector in India are lagging behind the organized sector and the gap is widening over time, as in Brazil. This might lead to an overestimation of the growth effects of structural change in an analysis which does not account for increasing informality.
Using the 21-sector data without a formal-informal split, we find that between 1993 and 2004, structural change was growth-enhancing, contributing 1.1% points to aggregate productivity growth (see Table 13 ), reflecting our earlier findings in Table 7 . However, when splitting each sector into a formal and informal part, the contribution of structural change drops to zero. This suggests increasing dualism in the Indian economy with high productivity levels and growth rates in the formal sector, partly achieved by economizing on the use of labor through outsourcing labor-intensive activities to small informal firms (Pieters et al., 2011) . And while informal employment is increasing, productivity growth in that sector is stagnating, leading to growth-reducing structural change. In this case, the sectoral productivity growth is less than the weighted sum of formal and informal productivity growth rates. This effect is picked up as a negative reallocation effect in our more detailed decomposition analysis, but not by an analysis based on aggregate data. Also within manufacturing a similar growth-reducing structural change is to be seen (results available upon request), in particular in transport manufacturing, where informality is growing rapidly.
At the very least the results in this section suggest that decompositions of growth should carefully consider the role of employment reallocation across formal and informal activities. Aggregate productivity growth trends hide the growthenhancing effects of a shift away from informal low-productive activities as in Brazil, and the growth-reducing role of reallocation of employment to informality in India.
Concluding remarks
New structural economists reinvigorate the argument that the nature and speed of structural transformation is a key factor in explaining economic growth (Lin, 2011) . McMillan and Rodrik (2011) argue that structural change is growth-enhancing in Asia, whereas it is growth-reducing in Africa and Latin America. However, empirical analysis of structural change in developing countries has been based on aggregated sector data (e.g. Bosworth and Collins, 2008; IADB, 2010; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011) , which may hide diverging trends at a more detailed level and thereby obscure a proper assessment of the role of structural transformation for aggregate productivity growth.
This paper studied patterns of structural change and productivity growth in four major developing countries since the 1980s, the BRIC countries, using a newly constructed detailed sector database. Based on a structural decomposition, we find that for China, India and Russia reallocation of labor across sectors is contributing to aggregate productivity growth, whereas in Brazil it is not. This strengthens the findings of McMillan and Rodrik (2011) . However, this result is overturned when a distinction is made between formal and informal activities within sectors. Increasing formalization of the Brazilian economy since 2000 appears to be growth-enhancing, while in India the increase in informality after the reforms is growth-reducing. (2) 1.1 0.0 Aggregate productivity growth (3) = (1) + (2) 3.8 3.8
The case of Brazil shows that growth-enhancing structural change is necessary but not sufficient for aggregate productivity growth. The shift of employment from informal to formal activities coincided with slow or even negative productivity improvements in formal industry and services. On the other hand, in India, informal activities expanded after the reforms, creating more dualism. The expansion of the low-productive informal activities was accompanied by dynamic formal activities, especially in the manufacturing and business services sector (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2011 ). India shows that growth-reducing structural change can go hand-in-hand with productivity improvements within particular industries generating high aggregate productivity growth. These divergent growth paths between India and Brazil indicate that within-and reallocation-effects have to be considered in combination in any analyses of structural change. Clearly, these analyses also depend critically on the level of sector detail used and should be interpreted with care.
The new sector database provides a more fine-grained analysis of economic growth and production in the BRIC countries. As such, the level of detail in this paper is in between micro (firm-level) analysis and macro analysis of growth. A drawback of this approach is that we may still miss out on important dynamics within sectors. For example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) explore the productivity distribution of firms within detailed manufacturing sectors within India and China and find that resource reallocation towards the most productive firms within narrowly defined industries may double productivity. In the end though, one is interested in the economy-wide effects of structural change and future empirical analysis should aim to analyze the role of resource reallocation for aggregate growth building up from the micro-level. The increasing availability of micro data that allow tracking employees across firms (e.g. McCaig and Pavcnik (2011) for Vietnam, and Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011) for Brazil), opens up a promising research agenda. Note: L i refers to the employment share of sector i. Numbers may not sum due to rounding. RP i refers to the productivity level of sector i relative to the total economy productivity level. P included in O.
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.jce.2012.02.004. Note: L i refers to the employment share of sector i. Numbers may not sum due to rounding. RP i refers to the productivity level of sector i relative to the total economy productivity level. P included in O. Note: L i refers to the employment share of sector i. Numbers may not sum due to rounding. RP i refers to the productivity level of sector i relative to the total economy productivity level. 19 included in 17t18. 61t63 included in 60. Note: L i refers to the employment share of sector i. Numbers may not sum due to rounding. RP i refers to the productivity level of sector i relative to the total economy productivity level. 50 partly included in 51 and partly in 52. P included in O.
